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FOREWORD
The Honorable Leonard Sullivan, a former Assistant Secretary
of Defense, maintains that the disorder in the post-cold war
world must be addressed in radically new and innovative ways. Old
alliances, structured for containment, will not be adequate in a
world where the challenges may be more appropriately addressed by
police forces than by traditionally structured military forces.
This sweeping analysis suggests that, in the future,
regional security apparatuses (RSAs) will be needed to deal with
problems which issue from specific socio-cultural and economic
conditions rather than from ideology or the pursuit of
traditional national interests by the superpowers. Mr. Sullivan
maintains that the United States can use its advantage in
technology as a part of its approach to meeting the many
challenges posed by "the new world disorder."
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
study as a contribution to that growing body of analysis dealing
with the post-cold war world.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Cold war concepts of superpowers, alliance systems, nuclear
deterrence and the accompanying military structures have lost
their relevance. The problems and challenges of this diverse and
disordered world might be better addressed by paramilitary or
nonmilitary forces than by military institutions and forces
structured and accoutered for traditional interstate conflict.
History may, indeed, record the 1990s as the beginning of
the end of the supremacy of the nation-state as it has existed in
western civilization since the French Revolution. Some states,
like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, have
already dissolved into a number of ethnically-based nations.
Germany and Yemen, on the other hand, have forsaken artificial
political structures imposed by cold war necessities to unite
into single nations.
Indeed, the world of the 21st
experience further upward drift in
authorities enforce global laws of
subnational organizations pursuing

century is most likely to
sovereignty in which regional
conduct over generally
criminal activities.

The alternative to the United States as the world's
policeman imposing a Pax Americana Technocratica is to establish
a number of regional security apparatuses (RSAs). These RSAs will
be charged with the collective enforcement of international laws
and standards as well as those specific to the regions involved.
Many of the technologies compelled and developed during the cold
war may be useful when employed by appropriately structured RSA
forces operating within new systems devised to meet a variety of
challenges.
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MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL SECURITY
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New Disorders Do Not Match Old Orders.
The disorders afflicting the world in the aftermath of the
oppressive global cold war will require the serious, long-term
attention of the civilized world. Virtually every region of the
world is experiencing some form of disorder which detracts from
inter- and intra-regional stability and diminishes aspirations
for both personal and collective prosperity. These disorders
simply cannot be dealt with effectively by security systems
designed primarily to perpetuate and petrify a tense equilibrium
between two antithetical, but supposedly equally legitimate,
approaches to politics and economics.2
Cold war concepts of superpowers, superpower blocs,
competing intra-regional military alliances, rigid "vital
interests," nuclear deterrence, and bilateral arms control have
lost their relevance. Even such well-ingrained distinctions as
"the West"3 as a meaningful entity with its "special
relationships," and the blind sanctity of "internal affairs" as
an excuse for ignoring inhumanity, have lost their credibility.
Prompt evolutionary change is essential to deal with the new
forms of danger which now challenge the more generally accepted
rules of human behavior.
There has probably never been a period when more governments
on Earth have codified what is right and what is wrong, or when
there were more organizations operating beyond those established
norms and standards. These improprieties run the gamut from
humanitarian, ethnic, military, and political, to economic,
trafficking, and environmental. Limits of acceptable conduct are
defined extensively by various government-ratified covenants,
treaties and agreements adopted through various formally
recognized organizations either global (U.N., World Bank),
functional (OECD, GATT, IAEA)4 or regional (NATO, CSCE, APEC,
ASEAN).5 Absent a clear-cut "red-blue" superpower ideological
contest, however, the world is ill-prepared and uncertain how to
react to conflicts between civility and incivility, conformity
and nonconformity, morality and legality, majorities and
minorities: Bosnia is but the most obvious and shameful case in
point.6

Controlling Crimes Versus Winning Wars. Most new world
disorders do not relate well to the current capabilities of the
world's military forces, designed to fight each other in huge
set-piece battles backed up by thousands of nuclear weapons. In
fact, many current disorders would be better handled by
paramilitary or nonmilitary forces. Many are really extensions on
a larger scale of previously domestic disorders: they are (or
started out as) crimes deserving legally accepted police actions
rather than the more macho but impersonal wars between military
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forces. Unchecked, some of these crimes have clearly grown out of
control, and surely do not honor the extensive codes of
professional military conduct (outlawing rape, torture,
starvation, civilian attack, and hostage-taking).
It also seems clear that in resolving many of these
disorders, the objective cannot be to defeat the criminal
element, but only to control the level of violence and
destruction to some level of international social tolerance.
Ethnic/religious strife appears to be as endemic to the new world
as are American casualties due to drunk driving, street crime,
and drug use.7 The issue is whether it can be contained within
tolerable levels, such as the decades of Irish and Palestinian
violence, or whether it is allowed to escalate to levels that
arouse the international conscience, such as genocide in
Cambodia, displacement of the Kurds, three-way mayhem in the
former Yugoslavia, or the wanton generation of refugees in
Lebanon.
There is also the question of increasing ambiguity about the
level of authority responsible for these organized
transgressions. Nations and/or allies tend to declare and conduct
war against other nations and/or alliances on a
government-to-government basis. Today's disorders may be
government directed (Sadam Hussein vs. the Kurds, or Yugoslavian
Serbs vs. Bosnian Muslims), but they are as often subnational
extremists (the Hezbollah vs. Israel, or the Irish Republican
Army vs. the United Kingdom); or renegade multinational
"corporations" (Latin American drug cartels, or BCCI-like banks).
Current security arrangements and forces are ill-equipped to deal
with nongovernmental crime, and to shift focus from being
anti-national to being pro-victim. Concepts of the inviolability
of "internal affairs" are slowly giving way to concepts of
"enforced humanitarianism," not only at the national level
(protection of minorities, child labor laws) but at the family
level as well (marital rape, children's rights).
Even the matter of arms control has clearly outgrown the
initial concepts of limiting nuclear arms and balancing the size
of opposing superpower conventional forces in Europe. There are
residual concerns over the possible mishandling of the major
nuclear arms inventories in the remnants of the Soviet Union, and
agreements on retargeting were reached in January during
President Clinton's trip to Moscow. However, the focus of concern
has now shifted to the "proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction" throughout the less-developed world.8 The old arms
control treaty framework is irrelevant in this case, as are the
highly formalistic verification regimes. Moreover, the
signatories to the START and CFE treaties bear little relation to
the new "players" (donors or recipients) in global arms
proliferation, such as China. It is also far from clear in many
instances whether the suppliers' governments are unaware of, or
tacitly or actively involved in, the transfers.
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Furthermore, the cold-war definitions of "proliferation" and
"weapons of mass destruction" are subject to change. It could
well be argued that rockets and artillery used against
defenseless civilian populations in places like Beirut, Sarajevo,
and South Lebanon should qualify as mass destroyers, even though
they did not recently proliferate from some far-off heinous
supplier, and even though the destruction takes months rather
than minutes to inflict. In fact, the wanton use of large caliber
and automatic weapons in the pursuit of clearly illegal political
activities is as unacceptable as the excessive use of firearms
(and semi-automatic weapons!) in petty crimes and drug
trafficking. International standards of conduct are being set,
and international inspection and enforcement must follow if our
common values are to be upheld.
One is reminded of the origins of the colloquial term "rule
of thumb." In 18th century America, it was deemed by the courts
unacceptable to thrash one's wife with a cane larger in diameter
than one's thumb. This was clearly an early, but not unique,
effort at arms control, if not peacekeeping. Perhaps the
civilized world should now deem it unacceptable to slay one's
enemies with a firearm of caliber greater than one's thumb.
Controlling the trafficking, possession, and use of arms
exceeding that rule could become a major responsibility for
emerging security forces. In this way, we might keep disorders
from exceeding our tolerance threshold.

Economics and Environment. In a different regime, there is
certain to be increasing international concern for environmental
transgressions, most of which are indifferent to arbitrary
national boundaries. Sooner or later, physical international
responses will become justified to control some form of
atmospheric pollution (such as Chernobyl-like fall-out, ozone
depletion, or acid rain) or resource abuse (such as preemption of
river waters or overkill of protected species), or even the
spread of communicable diseases (in humans, animals and insects).
Violations of economic agreements will continue to
precipitate armed struggles as well, from product dumping (e.g.,
China's opium wars) to fishing rights (e.g., Iceland's fishing
fleet vs. the British navy in the 1970s). As economic
"interdependence" continues to grow, and economic competition
replaces ideological competition as a central focus of national
governments, the "book of rules" is bound to grow, and so will
the temptations to circumvent it. The OECD is only now defining
"corrupt practices" in international commerce.9 "Trade wars" may
break out again, and violence over the abuse and exploitation of
workers may arise. Illegal trafficking in various commodities
from drugs and arms to workers and babies already occupies the
time of law enforcement agencies worldwide.
In a new world otherwise fascinated by remarkable
opportunities for growth in economic and political prosperity,
these disorders will have to be discouraged and controlled by new
3

mechanisms unlike any already extant: new authorities, new
formations, new training, and new equipment. New "rules of
engagement" will also be required that prevent the hesitant
application of force that can turn any operation into "another
Vietnam quagmire," or that prevent major nations like the United
States from participating.
Unfortunately, the emphasis will remain on "control" rather
than "discouragement"--i.e., on crime punishment rather than
crime prevention. One rare exception is the work of the IAEA in
trying to enforce the U.N.'s nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
through mandatory inspections. The difficulty of this task is now
being demonstrated in Iraq and North Korea. Moreover, the
approach is only valid where the host government controls the
operation. One cannot imagine an International Illegal Drugs
Agency being able to conduct inspections of drug-producing
facilities in Colombia or Burma.

Renewed Upward Drift in Sovereignty. Following the cold war
there is a renewed or accelerated upward drift in sovereignty.
More and more proud national prerogatives, from traffic signs and
passport design to area codes and interest rates, are being taken
over by international or global bodies. The shrinking, more
interdependent world is accepting greater standardization and
regulation of behavior and practices as means of sharing
increased humanity, security, and prosperity.10 Progress in the
European Community,11 APEC, and ASEAN cannot be ignored. At the
same time, there is more virulent and desperate resistance from
groups that wish to reject homogenization and return to the
supremacy of local cultures. The fractionalizing of Eastern
Europe is surely cause for concern, but the existing and solid
framework of the CSCE limits the vulnerability of the smaller
states. The struggle between "good" and "bad" is now often
evidenced as a conflict between supranationalism and
subnationalism.
"Globalization" trends in trade, finance, and business are
further eroding national sovereignty.12 International banks and
the large and spreading international corporations, as well as
the International Labor Organization, clearly recognize few
national boundaries. Collectively, they provide a major stimulus
for development and homogenization of the global workforce. The
adoption of international work (and quality) standards has
totally changed the nature of manufacturing, and vastly hastened
the internationalizing of technology development and application.
Many major products no longer have a meaningful "country of
origin." This has been highlighted in the global automobile and
electronics industries, and in the U.S. attempts to "punish"
Chinese business practices without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan.
These global business and finance trends have not been
overlooked by the criminal elements which have themselves
internationalized. They freely pursue trans-border illegal
activities, from bank fraud and money laundering to illegal
4

trafficking in drugs and arms, benefiting from the lack of
standardization of criminal law or its enforcement. Individual
nations cannot deal with international crimes beyond their
borders, but the U.N. cannot cope with dozens of simultaneous
warfighting infractions (13 as of January 1, 1993), to say
nothing of the dozens of continuously ongoing lesser crimes.13
In fact, history may well record the collapse of the cold
war as the beginning of the end of the supremacy of the
nation-state as the key structure in political, economic, or
societal development and stability. Some larger nations have
already begun to crumble in Eastern Europe and Asia, while some
of the arbitrarily divided states (Germany, Vietnam, Yemen, and
soon Korea) are reunifying. Furthermore, as the power of the
state declines relative to the influence of some of the illegal
operators, national governments can no longer be held responsible
for the crimes committed within their legal boundaries. Two
current examples include the major drug cartels in Colombia,14
and the usurpation of Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah elements
supported from Syria and Iran. Law enforcement must clearly
operate against criminal elements, and not just criminal or
"rogue" governments.
New Collective Security Mechanisms Will Evolve.
Internationalism and interdependence are clearly on the
rise, continuing, if not accelerating, the virtual shrinkage of
our planet. The notion of one (or two) superpower(s) with
catholic interests and concerns is no longer credible. There will
be no Great White Policeman of the World;15 no Global Bobby. Yet
there is a growing and inescapable demand to enforce
globally-adopted codes of individual and group conduct and
behavior. The new world must pursue universal human interests
guided by universal human values.
Clearly, nations will have to learn to act together to
preserve their agreed common values. The egocentric cold war
concept of committing national resources/treasure only to support
"vital national (self-)interests" is being supplanted by a
concept of "obligatory community service" to support global
values and enhance assurance of regional stability and
prosperity. In fact, such global values may flow from both supraand subnational organizations as well as from classic national
governments. International business conglomerates and relief
agencies have special demands at one end of the spectrum. Various
exploited minorities and the several nationless tribes (Kurds,
Palestinians, Montagnards, etc.) require protection at the other.

Current Security Institutions Dated. The concept of
interlocking regional U.S. military commands covering most of the
world seems anachronistic in a world without superpower struggle,
and with vastly reduced military budgets. Nothing could better
reinforce the empirical notion of "policeman of the world" than
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to have permanent unilateral "precinct stations" all over the
world. The U.S. "unified commands" for the Southern Hemisphere
(SOUTHCOM), and for the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean regions
(PACOM), will also need to be restructured to better represent
today's threats and today's divisions of responsibility.
Many lesser conflicts are being addressed by U.N.
peacekeeping forces after truces have been arranged.
"Trucekeeping" might be more apt. Bigger violations have been
handled by ad hoc arrangements, including the short-lived Suez
War, the U.S.-led Vietnam War, and the response to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. Sometimes larger powers have dealt with the
problems unilaterally--and quite awkwardly (Grenada, Falklands,
Panama). But there is growing resistance to the unilateral use of
military force, particularly to enforce unilateral diktats,
ambitions, or standards. Based on the newfound atmosphere of
cooperation in the post-cold war U.N. Security Council, authority
is shifting towards global approval/ endorsement of ad hoc
coalition responses for both prevention and punishment of
breeches of worldwide standards of conduct.
The costs to both the "criminal" and the enforcers must
reflect the severity of the misdemeanor or felony. Often, the
"punishment" (or persuasion) may simply be fines or other
sanctions to express displeasure but not exacerbate the
recklessness of the violator. Policies and procedures for
deterring, ameliorating or terminating unacceptable behavior will
certainly have to be "legal," not wanton. Unlike bipolar wars,
the "guilt" will have to be correctly "balanced" between
government and nongovernment instigators, (or, say, between the
supplier, the deliverer, and the demander in drug or arms
trafficking). Furthermore, both the breadth and severity of the
"crime" will have to be viewed through the culture of, and
resolved through the languages of, the afflicted region.
Additionally, use of excessive force ("brutality") against
persons or property will have to be avoided: neutralization and
incapacitation will replace death and destruction. Deliberate
overreaction needs to be discouraged. The "enemy" (criminals)
will often be protected by citizens' "rights," and their offenses
are as likely to be illegal businesses (drug/arms trafficking) as
violent crimes (hostage taking). Operations will have to respect
the constraints of responding within legal limits to offenders
who recognize no such constraints. Frequently, the offenses
cannot be eliminated, but only brought under acceptable control.

Global Gospel: Regional Enforcement. The notion of passing
directly to the U.N. all aspects of international law enforcement
requires a huge and unrealistic leap of faith. It is one thing
for the U.N. to be the major source of the Global Code of Ethics.
It is quite another matter to expect so large a political
committee to provide the instruments for its implementation.
There is no successful case of global management of any single
highly complex operation (business, relief) without the use of
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divisional or regional implementers. Even the Catholic Church
with its highly centralized focus on rule-making depends on
regional and subregional structures for "enforcing" its fiats.
The ability to manage dozens of diverse operations worldwide
almost certainly requires some intermediate levels of authority
and accountability.
It seems to me inescapable that the world will gradually
evolve a set of regional security apparatuses (RSAs) legitimately
authorized to enforce broadly (if not globally) accepted laws and
standards, while respecting the mores and peculiarities of the
region(s) involved. This report looks at some of the likely
procedures, characteristics, and authorities of RSAs tailored to
the needs of the coming century. Management and control,
operational procedures, and unit equipage of often ad hoc
coalition forces will be very different than we had come to
expect, and train for, in the NATO/Pact scenario. However, they
might well evolve from the increasingly anachronistic regional
unified command structure of the U.S. military.
RSAs, then, would be primarily charged with the collective
enforcement of international laws and standards within the
community (i.e., "behave or be penalized"). This is very
different from the recent military alliances for collective
security (like NATO and Warsaw Pact) formed to deter or wage
intercommunity wars with goals of "destroy or be destroyed." RSA
actions would draw more from civil police work (or CIA/DEA
"special operations") than from military missions like
counteraggression, deep strike, or antisubmarine warfare. In
essence, an RSA would reflect growing notions of "regional
sovereignty" over common, inseparable intraregional infractions
and disorders, and provide the mechanisms required to assure
reasonable, albeit certainly not total, compliance.
In this respect, RSA "forces" would be extensions of
domestic peacetime law enforcement agencies. Using such forces
would by no means be a "last resort" option as with military
forces. Many of their functions would be continuously exercised
to maintain intraregional "law and order." Moreover, casualties
would be inevitable and should become as accepted as losses "in
the line of duty" among the law enforcement agencies (LEAs).
Questions about whether such operations are "worth dying for" (as
now raised regarding Somalia) would be inappropriate.16

RSA Procedures and "Battlegrounds." Initial RSA responses
might simply involve more pro-active diplomacy, followed by
on-site inspections, and then by economic or political sanctions,
if needed. More serious violations might draw boycotts,
isolation, impoundage, or property forfeiture. In more acute
cases, population control, leadership "persuasion," arrests, or
even "SWAT team" actions against specific targets might be
authorized--once the offender has been legitimately "indicted."
The "battlefields" are far more likely to be
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urban/suburban/industrial areas rather than deserts, jungles, or
hedge rows, and the "targets" are more likely to be gangs,
governmental functions or industrial facilities than military
formations. Understanding, influencing, or, if necessary,
controlling the urban/industrial "anatomy" (infrastructure) will
be far more important than pinpointing and blasting enemy units
in the field. There is no body of expertise in this area
equivalent to that developed, say, to warn of--and react to--an
impending Warsaw Pact armor attack across the "inner- German
border" of yesteryear.17
There will frequently be a clear premium on acting swiftly
before a situation becomes unmanageable. However, the procedures
for instigating reactions are likely to be cumbersome at best and
the context in which the disorder originated may be quite obscure
at the outset. In any event, RSAs would perforce be permanently
staffed and should not require any awkward last-minute transfer
of assignment or control (a la NATO). They would be primarily
supported, however, by units drawn on demand from participating
members that have been cross-trained and equipped for RSA
operations.
RSA actions would probably be authorized (like warrants) by
some fully legitimate international body (or court), based on
some "finding" (declaration of emergency) or "indictment" (viz,
U.N. resolution) derived from some regional "prosecutor"
(security council?). The initial alert might come through some
crisis control center (a la CSCE), and confirmed by some sort of
fact-finding procedure: either a cooperative inspection mission
(like Red Cross in Azerbaijan or IAEA in Iraq), or a
noncooperative intelligence gathering program (such as "regional
technical means" or on-site "witnesses").

One Hypothetical Scenario. Consider a purely hypothetical
future scenario for East Balkan trauma in an era when a suitable
pan-European regional security apparatus (ERSA) has evolved
(presumably from NATO's remnants) under the general control of a
politically stronger CSCE of 60-odd nations (perhaps merged with
the Council of Europe), then embodying its own security council,
perhaps an outgrowth of the Western European Union (WEU) and/or
the new Forum for Security Cooperation.18 Assume that Moldovan
nationalists, supported by Romanian extremists, have begun to
brutalize the remaining resident Russian minority with increasing
ferocity, in clear violation of the recently adopted Code of
Conduct. A particularly nasty incident ravages a small village,
and Russia brings the issue into the CSCE crisis control center,
claiming that humanitarian precepts of both the U.N. charter and
the CSCE Code have been violated for the nth time by criminal
activities at or below the Moldovan national level.
The CSCE security council might then demand an on-site
inspection, but be denied by the Moldovan government-- implying
official collusion. The council might then declare an alert,
tasking its ERSA to gather indisputable intelligence for judgment
8

at the CSCE Review Conferences prior to presentation of the U.N.
satellite imagery, combined with testimony from covertly
extracted survivors, which might convince the U.N. Security
Council to promulgate a U.N. Resolution condemning (i.e.,
indicting) Moldovan nationalists and their Romanian supporters
for their criminal actions. The resolution could authorize
suitable ERSA nonmilitary responses, to be escalated under ERSA
operational command, but only if serious infractions continue.
The ERSA might then design and implement a program of stringent
economic sanctions, including the severing of vital economic,
financial and communications links with Romania.
At the same time, covert intelligence gathering operations
would be authorized in and around Kishinev, using ERSA special
teams from Russia and Ukraine. As a precautionary move, high-tech
special forces (perhaps drawn from 9-nation WEU multinational
units) would be readied for neutralization operations against a
special list of civil infrastructure "targets." The ERSA might
also assure that the Russian minorities are provided with various
equipments to insure direct encrypted reporting of further
violations. Some might also be provided special training in
target designation techniques.
Subsequent covert confirmation of such violations could lead
to authorization by the CSCE of escalated ERSA intervention in
accordance with the original U.N. resolution. Following suitable
warnings from the CSCE security council concerning the
consequences of official support for the crimes of the Moldovan
nationalists, certain essential infrastructure functions such as
communications, finance, transport, and electric power might
mysteriously begin to malfunction. Shortly thereafter, with
reluctant Moldovan government acquiescence, ERSA might mount a
joint special forces operation that successfully captures (for
trial) some--and disperses the rest--of the leadership of the
offending nationalist movement. Discussion of the elements of
such a regional security apparatus follows.
RSA Command Structure and Operations.
The preceding scenario depicts an evolving one-time ethnic
outburst requiring specific and unique reactions. However,
certain RSA responses should be automatic and not require fresh
political consensus. Just as a local fire department does not
need a go-ahead from its local council to respond to a fire
within its district, RSA activities should be internally
generated in response to recurring disorders (such as drug
trafficking, money laundering, or arms control violations).
Certain continuous enforcement/regulatory functions could well
gradually shift from national to supranational institutions: an
EC customs service; an ASEAN coast guard; a CSCE conventional
arms control service; or a Caribbean drug enforcement agency, for
instance.
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Command of each RSA would surely be civilian, not military,
and would most likely rotate between major nations of the region
as decided by some regional implementing charter or treaty.
Deputies and "J-staff" would surely include both military and
civil law enforcement groups adjusted to reflect the major
current threats in that region. For instance, a European RSA
under CSCE might be designed to focus on ethnic strife and forced
migrations, whereas a Latin American RSA (under an invigorated
OAS?)19 might focus on financial chicanery and drug trafficking.
Clear "connectivity" to all regional governments, law enforcement
agencies and military would be needed. The skills and prowess of
the military in communications, transport and logistics, and
intelligence would surely be essential.
The question of operational command of composite military
forces is not yet settled. There is a natural reluctance to place
major U.S. units under foreign control, and strong resistance to
allowing command to drift upwards to inexperienced individuals-or committees.20 This argument was settled by firm U.S.
leadership in the joint military reaction to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, and in the initial U.S. response to starvation in
Somalia. On the other hand, the recent squabbles between NATO and
the U.N. over the control of military operations into Bosnia, and
the difficulties being faced by the current U.N. control of
military activities in Somalia indicate the impracticality of
U.N. operational command. This is one sound reason for inserting
RSAs as regional operational commands between the global arbiters
of behavior, and the hands-on resolution of specific strife-prone
disputes.
RSAs will have to include access to respected, seasoned
regional military commanders with forces familiar with the
territory and its inhabitants. Ideally, a high-ranking military
deputy to the RSA director/commander would have some military
units (possibly rotating) seconded to his operational control at
all times, and would be responsible for their joint training,
readiness, and logistic support. The NATO notion of individual
country logistic support for joint forces would be clearly
unacceptable for forces expected to fight rather than posture
emptily in front of nuclear arsenals. Logistic problems among ad
hoc U.N. peacekeeping units are, unfortunately, legendary.
Each RSA could also provide a FEMA-like mobilization core
for assembling and deploying community responses to natural
(earthquake) and manmade (reactor meltdown) disasters,
environmental crises, or even plagues and pestilences. The
apparatus should be authorized to commandeer relevant assets,
such as transport and hospital facilities, and assure the
necessary regional logistic access through overflight, landing,
and docking rights. It should also be prepared to provide
"cultural advisory units" to help incoming strangers cope with
language and dialects, local mores and taboos, etc. (The British
provided Middle East desert-experienced NCOs to U.S. units
deployed to the Persian Gulf in DESERT SHIELD.)
10

RSA units might also augment inadequate (or reestablish
interrupted) national capabilities that threaten regional
stability. In roles reminiscent of "strike-breaking," special
units might, say, assume control of dysfunctional air traffic
control centers, reopen shut down pipelines, or bolster local
customs (anti-smuggling) capabilities. In rare incidents,
illegitimate or rogue governments (viz, Iraq) may need to be
deposed (an option certain to grow in acceptability through some
regional impeachment process). In others, the aim may be to
reestablish a functioning government where anarchy holds sway
(viz Somalia, or much earlier, the Dominican Republic). The
burdensharing of RSA costs could also involve trading
"contributions in kind": just as the United States provides LEA
training, say, to many developing countries, those countries
could provide translators for U.S. intelligence efforts.
Since RSA problems would run the gamut of civil law
enforcement and disaster relief agencies, RSA "reaction forces"
could well be mobilized from national civil agencies with
"reserve" roles in RSA activities (such as the U.S. Coast Guard
vis-a-vis our Navy). This dual-hatting could well be extended to
other federal agencies from Border Patrol and Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms, to Federal Aviation Agency and Customs Service.21
Mobilization would incur relaxation of various peacetime
statutory limitations, and bring into play new command and
control systems. One can conjure up diverse combinations of
French customs agents, British frogmen, Canadian Mounties, German
submarine units, and U.S. ATF agents, say, in the enforcement of
CSCE-dictated economic and arms sanctions against expanded Irish
terrorism. The possibilities are endless.

Military Functions. In some scenarios, the military roles
might exclude combat forces but extensively engage intelligence,
transport, and combat support personnel (from surveillance,
communications and engineers, to civil affairs, medical,
decontamination, and graves registration units). It is not
anomalous that military units will sometimes respond to
nonmilitary crises, such as disaster relief, while some
unauthorized military activities, such as Chinese missile
exports, may be countered by nonmilitary sanctions. Some military
commanders still resist being distracted from their readiness to
execute their "core missions" (like preparing for the re-birth of
the Evil Empire?), but others believe that "plowshare missions
hone the sword" by providing otherwise unavailable training and
experience, particularly in the joint arena.
Combat military units would range from infantry or military
police for peace- and trucekeeping activities, to elite
helicopter units to recapture an airfield, neutralize a port,
interdict smugglers, free prisoners, or shut down a central
telephone. Likewise, night-capable, side-firing gunships can
discourage urban artillery harassment or illegal resupply of
sanctioned commodities. Larger "enabling forces" might sometimes
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be needed to "kick open the door."
In most cases, "de-equipping" the offender's air and
air-defense forces, navy, or main army units--if deemed
necessary--would be a relatively simple (or even clandestine)
operation. Assurance of air supremacy would be key to conducting
highly specialized military operations with low collateral
damage. Elimination of ragtag submarine forces among Third World
countries should be a matter for regional/global arms control
initiatives, but could also be carried out expeditiously by RSA
elements.
Over the longer haul, multinational manning of certain
specific military units and functions should be feasible. In this
case, the extensive use of jointly manned units in the U.S.
forces defending the Republic of Korea might serve as the model:
Korean "KATUSAs"22 are host-country military personnel serving in
U.S.-led and U.S.-manned units. With increasing budgetary
stringency, even U.S. forces assigned to NATO have incorporated
"host nation support" units and staff augmentation. In fact,
NATO-owned AWACs surveillance aircraft supporting the air
exclusion zones over Bosnia are multinationally manned. While
certain combat units might better keep a national identity, there
seems little reason to avoid multinational combat support and
service support units. Base, depot, and troop support; air
defense, transport, medical, communications, equipment
maintenance, fuel handling, and many other essential logistic
tasks clearly can be shared with host countries' military and
civil assets.
In addition, there is no inherent reason why some supposedly
"unique" U.S. capabilities should not be manned internationally.
U.S. amphibious ships could certainly carry other nations' marine
forces. U.S. aircraft carriers could have several nations'
aircraft aboard, and use multinational crews. U.S. airlift assets
could include RSA-indigenous pilots, aircrews, and ground crews
from countries with their own modern national airlines. NATO has
demonstrated the practicality of a multinational headquarters, at
least during peacetime, and the WEU has some limited experience
in multinational command of naval units deployed into the Persian
Gulf and the Adriatic Sea.
One of the most essential characteristics of effective RSAs
will be absolutely reliable, secure, multichannel communications
throughout their regions, connecting not only the military units,
but the political infrastructure, and the various law enforcement
authorities. This is one enormous advantage of existing U.S.
unified and specified command structures-- and of NATO as well.
These noncombat functions can surely adopt shared manning during
noncrisis periods, and shared augmentation during high crisis
times.

Intelligence and Alerting Systems. Another particularly key
aspect of RSAs would be their resident and augmentable
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intelligence capabilities.23 They must have continuous
information on ongoing suspicious activities within their member
states, most likely supplied by internal law enforcement
agencies, but already frequently shared through international
links such as Interpol. These efforts must clearly be augmentable
with or without approval of the local jurisdiction harboring the
potential disorder. Intelligence must be both shareable with, and
collected independently by, the RSA members. U.S. intelligence
("sterilized," if necessary), could often make major
contributions to the RSAs--on demand. Holding supersecret and
sacrosanct the relevant outputs from U.S. "national technical
means" is yet another archaic and needless practice from the cold
war era.
Good, reliable, unambiguous, early intelligence would be
vital to sound collaborative RSA leadership and to its timely and
authoritative response. An RSA could voice the alert, prepare the
"indictment," assure swift and relevant responses, and set the
rules of engagement. Early publicity on disorders and egregious
violations of internationally accepted behavior can attract the
spotlight of regional/global concern and possibly nip them in the
bud and prevent their uncontrollable expansion. Bosnia/Serbia and
Somalia are both relevant examples of woefully untimely joint
reactions, based at least in part on the reluctance of some
countries that should be sharing the leadership role.
Just as U.S. forces use a "DEFCON" (defense condition)
ladder to symbolize alert status (DEFCON 5 is "all quiet"; DEFCON
1 a "major attack imminent"), and our intelligence community uses
"WATCHCONs" to prioritize focus on certain trouble spots, the
RSAs might use a "SUSCON" (suspicion condition) ladder to
mobilize various resources such as intelligence gathering in
response to various alerting systems (from CNN to escaped
prisoners). "Big Brother" would then be authorized to watch
closely only when suitably provoked, and then to perform on-site
inspections if deemed appropriate.

Extra-Regional Support and U.S. Role. While most RSAs should
be comprised of and managed by regional resources, "outside"
contributions may be required on demand from the U.S. or other
extraregional powers. Ancient animosities may make it impossible
for some members to participate in rectifying their own regional
disorders. Germans are not very welcome in Serbia; Egyptians are
not very welcome in Somalia; and so on. Special capabilities not
held by regional members might be needed, ranging from airlift to
precision air strikes, or from extinguishing oil well fires to
cleaning up nuclear fallout.
A hopefully diminishing role will be forthcoming for an
overextended United States. The failure of Europeans to grasp the
leadership of their own continent is a tragic psychic remnant of
cold war expedience, exhibited yet again in the Balkan crisis.
Latin American recalcitrance seems to have deeper roots. Only the
Asians seem relatively undisturbed by a declining U.S.
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dependence. But on occasion, the imprimatur of U.S. assistance
may be needed to assure regional action in any part of the world.
Support of global civility by participating in regional security
efforts--as a strong, honest broker--could well become a major
factor in U.S. force planning and design.24
Most important, albeit most elusive, however, is the
continuing need for the United States to express its outspoken
support for the ideal of global morality and the clear need to
extend and enforce international law and order. The world seems
to need some sort of "secular pope" who personifies global
standards of behavior, and, like it or not, most of the civilized
world looks toward the United States to provide that function,
even though presidential elections and U.S. congressional
priorities seldom relate to it. When the United States drags its
feet, progress in much of the world-- particularly Europe--slows
down.
New Operational Domains.
There are some significant new technological opportunities
that can be available to RSAs. Some capabilities are already
fielded with special units and forces, others are in use by LEAs,
some are awaiting a statement of need. They can be put together
very effectively, in the hands of well-trained troops, to provide
a new operational domain between hollow threats and passive
declaratory policies on the one hand and full-scale ground force
intervention or old-fashioned bombing on the other.
Nothing herein suggests that such operations would be
without risk, casualties, collateral damage, or some innocent
victims. Law enforcement and special forces operations are
certainly not "immaculate warfare," although they can be far more
discriminating than has been possible in the past. Nor is it
claimed that results would be immediate rather than cumulative.
In fact, the goal cannot be to "win decisively," but rather to
better balance and gradually reduce the violence to levels
apparently acceptable in other unsettled parts of the world--such
as Ireland, Israel, South Africa, or Washington, DC.25
The lower the intensity of the "war," and the more it
approaches a "law enforcement" operation, the more the overall
mission emphasis must change. Relatively greater focus must be
placed on developing reliable, unambiguous intelligence, even if
it takes substantial time, and less on the immediate destruction
of some convenient target set. More emphasis is needed on clearly
identifying targets that should not be destroyed--from cultural
symbols to friendly political elements. Ultimately, law
enforcement operations involve the gathering and presentation of
irrefutable evidence of the crime committed and the arrest of its
perpetrators ("target acquisition"), while "target destruction"
is replaced with the exercise of justice through the established
court systems. This requires military and para-military forces to
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adopt new and different standards of discipline and conduct that
are publicly judged (viz, the Rodney King police brutality case).
This new operational domain includes several new objectives
that are unfolding in situations like the Gulf, Somalia, and the
Balkans: the first is to use (para) military forces in the
enforcement of economic sanctions; the second is to cap the upper
limit of destructive power of the weapons used (such as tanks and
artillery); and the third is to generate confidence destroying
measures (CDMs) to persuade offenders and their followers
(whoever and wherever they are) that they are no longer in charge
of their own future, and that their unacceptable goals are not
achievable.

Concepts of Nonlethal "Persuasion." SA operations could
involve very innovative approaches to nonlethal "persuasion" to
alter abberant behavior patterns. The cold war catch word
"deterrence" may have little application against tribal/ethnic
zealotry, or the urge to accumulate arms. Terms "nonlethal
warfare" (slippery foam?) and "psychological warfare" (surrender
leaflets?) are generally disparaged. However, there is a potentially applicable nascent artform (popularized on the TV show
"Mission Impossible"), in which offenders are persuaded by
unexpected and/or uncontrollable events to either mend their
ways, lose their illegal holdings, or "self-destruct."26
Such CDMs may become acceptable forms of persuasion at the
national level as they are at the local level against hijackers,
and hostage takers. Their purpose is to reduce the assurance of
the perpetrators or their followers that their actions or cause
can produce the desired results. Against drug dealers, it might
be to interfere with their financial transactions. Against
terrorists, it might be to cause repeated premature detonation of
their devices. Against arms smugglers, it might be repeated
"accidental" loss of cargos at sea. Against violent subnational
movements, it might be dissention within the leadership caused by
suspicions of disloyalty. Among aberrant national governments, it
might be to convince their publics that their leaders can no
longer keep their national infrastructure operating at tolerable
levels.
In this regard, RSAs could eventually have to accept the use
of very specialized high-tech covert activities, just as law
enforcement agencies do, and develop realistic procedures for
their authorization.27 In particular, such operations could be
instrumental in minimizing harm and inconvenience to "innocent
bystanders" caught up in regional disorders. They could also
differentiate between destruction and disabling of key facilities
or "targets," thus hastening the restoration of normalcy and
lowering the clean-up costs. In many cases, such operations could
markedly reinforce the will and stature of an indigenous
resistance movement--if so desired.
The ability to use "dirty tricks" could become a significant
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element in CDMs, and its acceptability will eventually have to be
in some way approved, at least in general, by regional or global
authority. Disorders driven by greed, paranoia, fanaticism, and
rivalry are all susceptible to exploitation in one form or
another. Such vulnerabilities can be exacerbated by ignorance,
fear, and/or distrust of modern high technologies. Fledgling
Third World national infrastructures generally depend, for
instance, on foreign operation and/or support: an exploitable
opportunity for nonlethal persuasion. Each RSA would benefit from
having its own "Office of Strategic Services" (OSS)--to resurrect
a term and capability used successfully in World War II (and
which was eventually transformed into the CIA).

Economic Sanctions. Economic sanctions and political
exclusion, established forms of persuasion, have been generally
unsuccessful as currently practiced. Little rigorous and
professional analysis has been applied to improving their
effectiveness or developing alternatives. Military practitioners
understand the target sets that assure the functioning of heavy
weapon systems like artillery, barrage rockets, and tanks. But it
is by no means clear that Western strategists have developed
clear and rational taxonomies for enforcing economic sanctions.
In fact, it is not clear they have decided to prosecute the
providers or shippers as well as the receivers of proscribed
commodities. Furthermore, the gamut of economic infrastructure
"targets" surely must extend beyond transportation equipment and
facilities to civil communications and financial institutions.
Similarly, CDMs should include interruptions of (or at least
distrust for) seemingly essential domestic services and economic
support systems like public media and news sources, telephones,
and urban transport. Many of these "target sets" are well-suited
to influence by modern technology, but generally have been of
little military interest.

Leadership Management. Various combinations of the
capabilities outlined above are bound to give rise to renewed
consideration of means for altering the leadership of rogue
states and tribes short of the classic notions of "decapitation"
(like the abortive raid against Qaddafi). I believe it quite
likely, for instance, that if a decision had been made to "arrest
and remove" (kidnap?) Noriega from power in Panama as a covert
operation rather than a full fledged military campaign, modern
technology would have permitted it to be successfully carried
out--primarily by nonmilitary forces, using military supporting
assets. Similar choices may have been available in the
well-intended but clumsy Grenada caper. Such unconventional
operations may become more politically acceptable as criminal
elements expand the viciousness of their acts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues.
While fear of retaliation may continue to bar actions
against national leaders (i.e., assassination), the same qualms
probably do not prevent actions against other classes of
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"international criminals." It is, in fact, a primary option among
domestic law enforcement agencies everywhere--once an "arrest
warrant" has been obtained. Such parallels should be extended to
regional security efforts, if they can be demonstrated to be
practical and useful. The U.N. forces' pursuit of the Somalian
"warlord" Aideed is a case in point. Not only were elements of
U.S. special operations forces unsuccessful in capturing him
during a 3-month pursuit, but the U.N. command subsequently
decided he was no longer a criminal!28

Leverage For the Good Guys. These approaches depend in
varying degrees on the growing gap between the higher
technologies and greater wealth of the RSAs and those available
to the offenders (not always true in the drug war!). Many can
benefit from human cooperation from within the contested area.
Indeed it should be possible to give such resistance movements
enormous new leverage in the passing of intelligence and the
application of power. Some require substantial "air superiority,"
others require only that the good guys control the night
airspace. Many are also less effective in bad weather, but
together, they can lower substantially the offenders' options and
freedom of activity.
The theme behind many of these developments is to allow the
"enforcers" to shift away from "we can bomb you back into the
Stone Age, with precision and from over the horizon" (or "reach
out and touch someone, anytime, anywhere" as the Air Force likes
to say) towards something more like: "we know what you're doing;
you can run, but you can't hide." In essence, our forces must
become omniscient, not omnipotent.
New Technological Opportunities.
The following section discusses briefly some emerging
capabilities in a variety of areas pertinent to the three tasks
previously described in this new operational domain (economic
sanctions, damage limiting, and CDMs). Note that many of these
capabilities can and should be introduced as part of contingency
preparations for subsequent actions. Note also that these new
capabilities do not obviate the continuing need for excellent
"main force" units.
Many of these technologies had their origins in the
frustration of the Vietnam war, but have since proved themselves
in the "wars" against drug traffickers, mafia, and terrorists,
and in limited operations such as Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf.
Others not mentioned here are doubtless used only by special
agencies in covert operations. Others still languish for lack of
suitable priority and funding.
In the United States and elsewhere, the relatively
inexpensive research, development, technology, and engineering
efforts required to enhance law enforcement capabilities,
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including arms control, should supplant some of the vast sums
still spent for obsolescent major war weaponry.

Area and Traffic Surveillance. "Realtime," daytime,
clear-weather satellite photographic coverage is, of course,
outstanding, and now becoming more easily distributed to
operational and tactical headquarters. A variety of photorecce
aircraft, and unmanned drones, ground- or air-launched, are
available to gather more detailed tactical information when
weather permits. Infrared surveillance satellites, developed to
detect ICBM missile launches, are believed to have some value in
detecting tactical ballistic missile launches, but are probably
not adequate to detect artillery and barrage rocket fire.
There are many devices for detecting and locating electronic
emanations across the full radio frequency spectrum. The ability
to analyze their signals and generate suitable jamming responses
is a matter of course. Generating an accurate "electronic order
of battle" over a few days or weeks is routine, if the assets and
their early use are authorized.
The United States has been perfecting airborne radars to
detect moving ground traffic for 30 years.29 The latest
prototype, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(J-STARS), was used successfully to detect main avenues of
advance (and retreat) for Iraqi main force units without entering
Iraqi airspace. Coverage is day/night/all- weather, but may be
somewhat reduced by mountains (depending on orbit location).
JSTARS did help detect and track Iraqi missile transporters
approaching or leaving their launch sites, and on occasion
vectored orbiting fighter aircraft.
JSTARS was not conceived to monitor legal or illegal
economic traffic (rail, road, inland water, sea), but it should
be able to develop reliable traffic patterns of any kind over
time--and can be used prior to hostilities. With 12-hour
on-station times, it should also be able to monitor significant
truck traffic at border-crossing points, but the side-looking
radars cannot reliably distinguish vehicle types unless the
targets are suitably "tagged."
In the main, however, the evolving spectrum of likely
disorders cannot be dealt with from airborne or orbital stations.
Human intelligence, gathered first hand on the ground in the
troubled areas, will be key to understanding the conflict and
developing carefully tailored solutions. In this respect, many of
the technology items listed below enhance the capabilities for
exploiting "humint" and other clandestine operations.

Target Identification and Synthesis. High resolution
satellite photography can generally distinguish vehicle types. If
cued as to where to focus (e.g., "near Vlasenica"), it can surely
detect prison camps, artillery parks, and mass gravesites.
Accuracy should be good enough for preparing "indictments" of
18

illegal activity, showing buildups of suspect targets over time,
assessing strike damage, and, of course, developing up-to- date
maps of crucial urban and industrial areas. Coupled with modern
digital computer photo processing, these photos can provide the
basis for generating 3-D models (at any scale) for attack
profiles, training, and missile terminal guidance. Satellites are
of dubious use for real-time target designation.
Modern ground-based phased-array radars also make practical
the detection of incoming artillery and mortar rounds, with
almost instantaneous computation of their launch point. Providing
these truck-sized units and their small, skilled crews is step
one in stopping urban artillery sieges. Installing, calibrating
and bunkering them before hostilities would improve
effectiveness, and possibly provide some deterrence value as
well.

Urban/Economic Target Analysis. Although the military
mindset is accustomed to singling out obvious targets of
immediate military value, the highly regimented intelligence
organizations have little experience in diagnosing urban and
economic infrastructure for less than destructive purposes.30
This is not a problem in technology, of course, but in choosing
analysts and priorities. For instance, a cadre of former mayors,
businessmen, city planners, or financial managers would develop
totally different anatomical views of urban areas than would a
set of bomber pilots. This is an area where preparation time
could make a vast difference, and broaden the range of suitable
"targets of persuasion." Such efforts require and deserve the
ability to "mobilize" pertinent personnel and assets for short
periods of time.
Rapid manipulation of huge diverse data bases is key to
dissecting criminal infrastructures, and identifying relevant
regional and global linkages. New digital processing techniques
for photographic images can vastly improve the generation of new
maps of unfamiliar regions (including the urban anatomy of
infected cities). They can aid in reaction force planning and
training. One 10-inch optical disc can easily store (and display
at any scale with 4-digit coordinates) every available map of the
Balkans from the National Geographic down to local road and
street maps, and compare them with available aerial photographs,
given a modest compilation leadtime of a few weeks. Simpler
versions of these capabilities are already available commercially
as aids for travelers and tourists.
Using optical scanners and computer mapping, I would
estimate that every telephone number in New York City could be
converted to its 4-digit coordinates by "reading" phone book
addresses! Electronic systems can doubtless sort out normal and
unusual (legal or illegal?) electronic fund transfers, telephone
calls, border crossings, or container shipments.

Target Selectivity and Monitoring. The ability to single out
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specific structures (bridges, tunnels, locks, docks, buildings,
TV/radio towers, and power distribution points) for special
lethal or nonlethal attention has improved greatly. Although
reliability is surely not 100 percent, many newer weapon delivery
systems do now achieve operational records over 80 percent of
hitting an aimpoint within about 10 feet (day or night). These
include terminally-guided mortar and artillery shells, armed
helicopters, PGM-laden high-performance aircraft, side-firing
gunships, and stand-off cruise missiles, first tried in Vietnam
in the early 1970s.31 Accuracy and selectivity improve as
opposition drops--and with increased use of trained ground
spotters familiar with the area.
While mountainous and foliated regions offer the defender
certain undeniable advantages, they also create certain
vulnerabilities. These include canalizing traffic; increasing
dependence on roads, bridges, and tunnels; and limiting warning
time of an incoming strike, or other covert operation.
Dead-of-night sweeps by attack helicopters or aircraft at low
altitude down narrow valleys in response to JSTARS alerts could
be quite awesome, particularly if only very specific targets were
engaged, captured, or lifted away! Rugged, foliated terrain also
provides excellent cover for special operations, as Yugoslav
partisans demonstrated during World War II.
The ability to keep certain classes of targets under
continuous surveillance has also improved vastly in recent years.
A variety of remote read-out sensors is now routinely available
(even to homeowners) to provide alerts of intrusion, motion,
vibration, heat, smoke, noise, magnetic metals, or
what-have-you.32 Most require on-site installation, of course.
Properly and covertly installed, there should be relatively
little difficulty in knowing when a bridge is being crossed, an
artillery firing position is occupied, a loading dock is being
used, a storage site vacated, a palace or bunker visited, an
apartment (or a telephone) is being used, a lock has been broken,
and so on. Tiny concealed and sensor-activated TV cameras can
provide unambiguous proof of occupancy and activity. (Ask the
former mayor of Washington!). Such sensors can now be routinely
linked to communications satellites. Pre-hostility insinuation of
a few dozen high-tech undercover agents could make potential
trouble spots much easier to control subsequently.

Target Designation and Location. The unambiguous designation
of a particular point against which to aim a weapon, or a
parachute drop for that matter, is also becoming routine. A
variety of hand-held (and I assume remotely deployable) and
digitally-encoded laser designators are now available, giving a
lone forward observer the ability to call in anything from
artillery shells to 5000-pound bombs. Laser reflecting paints and
various types of beacons can also enhance target prominence. Some
were invented to locate downed aircraft and pilots, others are
used routinely to improve air traffic control performance.
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The ability to take photographs or TV tapes clandestinely
has improved greatly. Individual TV pictures can be printed out
in hard copy with portable devices like facsimile machines.
Handheld photos transmitted by fax machine can improve confidence
in the designation of individual targets, or even be used for
subsequent photomatching missile guidance. Photographic evidence
of individuals and specific crimes are obviously useful in
identifying ring leaders for "indictment"--or passport inspection
at border points.
Virtually anyone who wants to, from camper or boatsman to
soldier or pilot, can know where he is in absolute worldwide
coordinates within a few tens of feet. This is how U.S. forces
navigated the Arabian deserts, how coastal drug traffickers
establish underwater caches for subsequent diver recovery, and
how U.S. trucking firms keep track of their vehicles. This is
also how one-way cruise missiles can navigate to their "dump
point," and covert agents can reach a predetermined extraction
point.

Target Tracking and Seeking. One emerging capability largely
ignored by the military is that of "tagging" targets in order to
track them when they move, as biologists track migratory animals,
birds, and, with the Navy's help, whales.33 The LEAs, on the
other hand, have learned to use various kinds of beacons or other
markers by which to follow critical items. A famous Drug
Enforcement Agency caper attached beacons to barrels of chemicals
sold to drug dealers through a New Jersey "sting" operation, and
then tracked the barrels (intermittently) by satellite to their
arrival in a Bolivian jungle cocaine factory, which was
subsequently raided by a "joint" paramilitary force.
Other automated marking systems are used to identify
railroad cars in transit, stolen money, merchandise not paid for,
cleared personnel, and so forth. Many of these techniques can be
used in monitoring economic sanctions, or tracking commodities to
unknown destinations. The first commercial devices for police
tracking of stolen automobiles is now on the market for a few
hundred dollars.
Most of these marking systems obviously require access to
the "target" for marker installation. Again, for tracking illegal
products, arms, or even bullet-proof sedans, such access should
be available at some time either openly or clandestinely. In
fact, installation by the manufacturer could become a condition
for initial sales and resales. Such devices may eventually
provide routine verification of arms control pacts, or aid in
limiting arms proliferation. They will also lead to
nontransferrable "smart passports," "smart license plates," and
"smart containers," by which to screen out a few suspects from a
large continuous peacetime flow of travelers and goods.
Homing devices now employ a variety of seekers that enhance
their accuracy manyfold. Homing on small beacons is now routine
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in searching for downed pilots, military or civil. Homing on
illegal radio broadcasters is used routinely to enforce
communications rules and standards. Homing on effluents from
various illegal activities or environmental violations is
practical. Weapon seekers range from radar-seeking missiles to
destroy radars, to infrared and optical seekers that allow a
pilot to remotely steer the missile to its aimpoint. While most
still require relatively clear air, nighttime is as acceptable as
daytime.

Target Tainting. Technologies also permit the "doctoring" of
various commodities and things so that they no longer serve their
intended purposes--or stop working on command. Ammunition can be
doctored to explode on command, by handling, or prematurely on
firing. Fuels can be polluted to gum up or stop engines. Vehicle
engines can be remotely commanded to stop running. Some drugs
might be given frightening or embarrassing nonlethal side
effects. Again, access is required, but is more plausible in the
environments foreseen. Preparation time, of course, can be
extremely useful--if not essential.
Such tainting can also extend to making certain areas
untenable through mining or dusting with other chemicals. Some
techniques may be particularly useful for enhancing "resistance"
movements, while others may be more applicable to the enforcement
of economic sanctions. Chemicals can be developed to taint
illegal commodities or identify their handlers and users (as now
used to "label" bank robbers). Built-in or covertly added
disabling systems can make illegally obtained weapons and
equipment inoperable. Some "golden key" systems are believed to
be used in sensitive weapon systems sold to dubious Third World
adventurists, and could be added to vital high-tech components of
various urban and national infrastructure elements (from air
traffic control radars and telephone switching centers to payroll
computers--and money counters!).

Sensory Enhancement. One of the most successful technologies
to derive from the Vietnam war has been night vision devices
which essentially let people see under conditions with virtually
no visible light. Western military and law enforcement agencies
commonly use such devices, as do various categories of criminal
elements.34 Equally important, many of the newer devices work
almost as well through many types of fog, smoke and even dust
storms, providing enormous advantages to their users. In fact,
man-made dust storms (created, say, by helicopter rotor wash) or
smoke can help balance uneven odds.
Virtually all the human senses can now be augmented.35 New
biotechnologies will almost certainly lead to improved olfactory
sensors for detecting the presence of drugs, explosives, and even
aliens in confined spaces (like containers, automobile trunks,
and sealed truck bodies). New techniques are already being
fielded for detecting dangerous chemical aerosols (e.g., poison
gases). Utilization and effectiveness of animal sensors (such as
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dogs' noses) can doubtless be expanded for tracking smugglers,
finding the remains of crime victims, and searching for illegal
commodities. Combining sensors and modern computer technologies
will almost certainly make possible new nonintrusive means for
detecting liars and guilt, overhearing remote conversations, and
pinpointing the origins of gunfire.

Decoys and Deception. Decoy equipments and false clues of
subversive activities (empty gun packages, supply parachutes,
beached rubber boats, etc.) can be proliferated to saturate
defenses and destroy confidence. Many new technologies used in
the entertainment industries have possible applications.36
New computerized digital processing of photographic/TV
information can also prey on the common belief that "seeing is
believing"; photographic "evidence" can be synthesized of
compromising behavior by political or religious leaders. Various
religious taboos and ethnic biases can be exploited in many
creative and very subtle ways.
New telephonic devices can clearly be manipulated for
psychological purposes. The ubiquitous fax machine, for instance,
is remarkably susceptible to creating doubt and suspicion. Its
output is easy to read (not even an envelope to steam open), and
the sender's identity and location can be masked (the sender's
"stationary" cannot even be checked for authenticity). The
greater the criminals' paranoia, the more likely they are to
react to bogus materials designed to cast doubts on, say,
personal or organizational loyalties.

Communications Management. Satellites make it possible for
relatively small transmitters to connect with the rest of the
world. Modern electronics allows "digital burst" transmissions
which rapidly transfer essentially secure data. Lap top computers
and fax machines permit very sophisticated exchanges either
through existing communications channels, or completely outside
them. In a relatively unsophisticated background environment, one
can be virtually assured of being able to keep in extensive
contact with friendly forces of all kinds--anywhere.
While friendly communications can be extensive and secure,
the extant communications of the offenders, both civil and
military (drug dealers and Iraqis notwithstanding), are likely to
be quite vulnerable to intercept.37 Particularly if there are
opportunities before difficulties grow to "get into the systems,"
it is quite likely that the offenders can be placed at a
substantial disadvantage. Those offenders, as mentioned earlier,
should include outsiders who collude with violators of economic-or military--sanctions. Those who sign up in international fora
to impose sanctions on a neighbor must be willing to have their
promises tested, and if necessary, supervised and enforced by
international authorities.
The surveillance of military communications is somewhat more
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difficult, but after 40 years of learning about Soviet military
equipment, it is unlikely that friendly forces would be unable to
eavesdrop on any forces equipped by them, or by any other
obsolescent equipment. Almost certainly, computer-driven
electronic financial transactions can be intercepted. They have
become a virtual necessity for international commerce and
banking. They should, if transparent, be an important source of
information on illegal transactions concerning arms or economic
trade.
Communications are an important source of national and
business confidence. The ability to "get into" any or all of
these systems and sow confusion or doubt could provide a very
significant "nonlethal" confidence-destroying measure. Airborne
and ground equipment exists to overpower existing radio and TV
stations and insert one's own programs. Endless "dirty tricks"
can be played by getting into or simply using the host country's
telephone system. Automatic switching systems are complex enough
to present significant problems if damaged (or altered). Mail
service can be disrupted. Electric power distribution can be
upset. Interfering with or stopping electronic financial
transactions could certainly cause widespread concern.

Weapon Range and On-Station Time. Other technological
advances have made possible far greater "stand-off" range in the
delivery of high accuracy ordnance against a variety of discrete
targets. The general class of air-, ground-, and sea-launched
cruise missiles (including from submerged submarines) offer
substantial (albeit not yet perfect) opportunities to retaliate
very quickly and with great surprise against violations of
established behavior from distances of several hundred miles.
These missiles do not need "air superiority" to very selectively
remove elements of a military, economic, or governmental
infrastructure.
The advent of airborne tankers, improved engine efficiency,
and the "weaponizing" of long-endurance transport aircraft make
it possible to maintain weapons "on-station" for hours at a time-all night, if desired. Shorter-range helicopter units can
sometimes establish temporary forward ground refueling stations.
Striking back quickly at various infractions (and before the
target disperses) can be key to deterring their continued or
expanded use.
U.S. special forces now operate very capable fifth
generation AC-130 side-firing gunships with extensive night
vision capabilities. Given air superiority, these units can orbit
trouble areas all night and return devastating, adjustable,
large-bore automatic cannon fire very selectively. They can shoot
armor-piercing rounds, as well as others. Developed initially for
the war in Vietnam (urban defense, and resupply interdiction),
AC-130s were an important component of the JUST CAUSE night
operations against Panama City as well as in DESERT STORM. They
could be particularly valuable (together with other sensors) in
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interdicting illegal shipments, applying economic and urban
"persuasion," and alleviating artillery and mortar sieges. The
C-130 airframe is standard throughout western forces, but its
attack equipment is not! C-130s could, however, readily be manned
and maintained internationally.
Precision-guided munitions can now be delivered without
involving aircraft as the often-vulnerable, sometimes
time-consuming "middlemen." Ground-based artillery and
longer-range missiles can remain "on-station" at the ready
essentially indefinitely. U.S. attack submarines and surface
combatants also carry high-precision cruise missiles with ranges
over 700 miles, and can stay on station for months. Although the
failure rate on these cruise missiles appeared unfortunately high
in the retaliatory strikes against Saddam Hussein's military
installations, reliability improvements as well as on-site target
designators can greatly enhance their effectiveness and
discreetness.

Night Operations. Denying the free use of the night to the
offender seems key to "leveling the battlefield" for the
enforcers. Night operations not only inspire awe and disadvantage
the offender, but they can also reduce collateral damage and
civilian casualties in the workplace. Giving the appearance of
vastly superior intelligence, and assiduously avoiding needless
damage or violence, are both important ingredients in regaining
the upper hand. JUST CAUSE provided our first large-scale
(25,000-man) quasi-military operation against an urban target
(since the U.S. operation into the Dominican Republic)--and it
was kicked off at 2:00 AM! DESERT STORM operations were conducted
around the clock. Virtually all U.S. forces and law enforcement
agencies are fully equipped and trained in night operations.
Personnel Insertion/Extraction. A variety of new
technologies are improving the ability to insert and extract
individuals (or equipment) deep within contested territory.
Modern aerodynamics, accurate navigation, night vision devices,
acoustic suppression, and "stealth" radar reduction can be
combined to provide assured (if limited) access, essentially
wherever desired. Covert operations, like "dirty tricks," can
become an important element in limiting the extent and impact of
illegal operations of any kind. "Night visitations" (a very
successful Viet Cong tactic) as an alternative to permanent
"occupation" may deserve further consideration.
High-Tech Special Forces. Many RSA missions would still
involve the relative routine application of existing capabilities
for peacekeeping, disaster relief, election monitoring, and the
like. A variety of military and civil assets are available for
their conduct. The more difficult scenarios involving more
zealous and ardent criminal elements require the development of
major new capabilities. Technology can make many of these
practical.38
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Technology can be applied in ways that certainly limit (but
surely do not eliminate) the need for long-term commitment of
vulnerable ground forces within the disordered zone. In
particular, the effectiveness of internal/underground resistance
movements can be magnified enormously, in many cases without
arming them. Nowadays, it is virtually impossible to deny
clandestine communications (via satellite) from within a
beleaguered area. Covert insertion and extraction of people and
things are routine in a benign air threat environment. Many
high-tech "targets" can be rendered inoperable without destroying
them. Other targets can be designated and pinpointed for very
precise attack within minutes or hours by stand-off weapons
launched from behind a hill or from hundreds of miles away. Very
small beacons, remotely operated, can provide unambiguous
aimpoints for very large homing weapons (or guided parachute
drops). It is not inconceivable that if these technologies had
been available to various European resistance movements during
World War II, many months of high intensity, high casualty war
could have been avoided.
In a different area, the successful enforcement of economic
sanctions could provide a major instrument (and future deterrent)
for RSA. It is clearly within the technological state of the art,
particularly as practiced by U.S. LEAs, but not by main unit
military forces as currently configured. Violations of economic
sanctions involve commodities of some sort, their providers and
recipients, and various transfer links in between; a range of
appropriate actions can be developed against each. Twenty-first
century blockades and sieges may be crucial to restoring local
law and order. Little if any rigorous research, analysis, or
development has been conducted in these areas. It is
inconceivable to claim we can field an effective "Star Wars"
antimissile system, but cannot stop the illegal flow of usable
fuel oil to Serbia (or of chemical or nuclear warheads for that
matter), either at the source, in transit, or at intermediate and
final destinations.
High technology can also be used effectively to deny the
battering of urban areas and their populations as happened so
tragically in Beirut and is now being repeated in Sarajevo.
Counterbattery radars can accurately pinpoint the launch site of
artillery, rocket and mortar fire, and airborne surveillance can
often track the subsequent retreat of the attackers to their
defensive positions and storage sites. Remote sensors can provide
excellent indicators when known firing sites are occupied. A
variety of very precise weapon systems operable at night and even
in inclement weather can be used in a benign air environment to
destroy such capabilities and force the attacker to use a lower
level of harassment.
The successful application of capabilities such as those
outlined above will require the formation and training of new
kinds of high-tech (possibly covert) special units--military,
paramilitary, or law enforcement agency--quite possibly
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multinational in the longer term. Designing, training, and
equipping such units requires substantial creativity. The legal
ramifications deserve substantial thought, and command and
control of ad hoc multinational units needs special technical
attention. In any event, the popular vision of "special forces"
as snake eating, swamp swimming, throat slitting renegades will
have to be replaced with (or at least expanded to include) a new
generation of high-tech science fiction heros capable of
employing the full range of emerging technologies to defeat the
persistent forces of evil.
Conclusion.
Post-cold war disorders more closely resemble crimes than
wars, and seldom pit government against government in
high-intensity combat. The crimes are generally gross violations
of the growing body of international law, but not wars that can
be won in the military sense. They must be countered by a
combination of military, paramilitary, and civil agencies
applying a variety of political, economic, and physical
sanctions. The question is whether such global laws and
conventions will be enforced by global, regional, or national
authorities. Neither global responses by the U.N. nor unilateral
responses by individual nations (including the United States) are
appropriate. The best alternative is to evolve RSAs capable of
maintaining law and order within "acceptable" levels of
(inevitable) violence, using a new combination of "high-tech"
civil and military resources specifically tailored to deal with
these categorially different circumstances.
Altogether, the development of versatile RSAs for Europe,
the Middle East, Latin America, and the Asia/Pacific region
presents some fascinating alternatives to the now obsolete
functions of NATO--and many unilateral roles and commands
currently peculiar to U.S. forces. The United States would do
well to encourage the formation and implementation of regional
security apparatuses and to apply some of its now surplus
technological creativity to augmenting their inspection, law
enforcement, and paramilitary capabilities and to enhancing their
effectiveness. The gradual transformation of both NATO and the
U.S. Southern and Pacific Commands into RSAs would make excellent
test cases.
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11. For an assessment of the "unstoppability" of European
28

integration, see Anthony Morris, Europe 2000: Union or
Fragmentation, Occasional Paper No. 14, Jean Monet Council,
George Washington University Forum in European Studies, July
1993.
12. Issues of diminished sovereignty have been highlighted
by critics of both the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the globally more important General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Uruguay Round. One reasoned article on
the dangers is by Clyde Prestowitz, "How America Could Give Away
the Store in the Next Big Trade Treaty," The Washington Post,
November 28, 1993.
13. The growing number of U.N. peacekeeping operations is
summarized by CIA analyst Frederick H. Fleitz, "(EURA/UN)
Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1993" (and notes thereto),
October, 31, 1993.
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Defense Science Board task force study, Detection and
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23. In a remarkable rationalization, Caleb Baker explains
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International, December 1993.
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permanent representative to the United Nations, "The United
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29. Airborne radars for detecting enemy aircraft have been
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